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Summary
In this paper we reply to arguments of Kroon (“Characterization and Existence 
in Modal Meinongianism”. Grazer  Philosophische Studien 86, 23–34) to the 
eff ect that Modal Meinongianism cannot do justice to Meinongian claims such 
as that the golden mountain is golden, and that it does not exist.
1. Introduction
Meinongianism is the view that some objects do not exist. After some 
decades in the wilderness, the view is now, rightly, resuming its place on 
the philosophical landscape. In fact, it has been pretty orthodox for most 
of the history of Western philosophy: its period in the wilderness is an 
historical aberration (see Priest 2008). Given the developments in the tech-
niques of logic since its falling from favour, the view can now be articulated 
with a precision and determination that it did not, before, enjoy. In fact, 
there are various such articulations on the market. In a recent paper, Fred 
Kroon raises interesting objections to one variation of it (Kroon 2012: 
page references are to this unless otherwise indicated). Th e point of this 
work is to reply to such objections.
Th e objections center around the Characterization Principle.  Th is is a 
principle that tells us something about the properties of objects that may 
not exist. As a fi rst cut, this is that an object, characterized in a certain 
way, has those properties it is characterized as having. It can be framed for 
either defi nite or indefi nite descriptions.  Since defi nite descriptions can be 
defi ned in terms of indefi nite ones (the so and so is a unique so and so), we 
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will mostly employ indefi nite descriptions in this essay. Using ? as such a 
description operator, then, when A(x) is any condition with free variable 
x, one can understand the naïve Characterization Principle as claiming:
CP: A(?xA(x))
No one, however—Meinongian or otherwise—can endorse this: in a two 
line argument, it leads to triviality. Let A(x) be the condition x = x ? B, 
with arbitrary B.  Let t be ?xA(x). Th en by CP, t = t ? B; and so, B (see 
Priest 2005, viii).
One approach to the problem is to restrict the Principle to a limited 
vocabulary, composed of predicates often called nuclear (see Parsons 1980, 
Routley 1980, who calls the predicates characterizing). Th us, CPN is CP 
restricted to those A(x) which contain only such predicates. A diff erent 
approach, the so-called “dual copula” approach (Rapaport 1978, Zalta 
1983, 1988), is to hold that ?xA(x) does not instantiate A(x) at all; rather, 
it bears the relation of encoding to it, AE(?xA(x)), where AE(y) does not 
entail A(y): encoding is a relation diff erent from the ordinary instantia-
tion of properties by objects, typically expressed by the copula (hence the 
name of the approach). Quite generally, one can then have AE(?xA(x)).1 
Call this CPE.
A third approach is now coming to be called Modal Meinongianism 
(MM): see Berto 2011, 2012, Priest 2005.2 In a nutshell, it goes as follows. 
Th ere are worlds other than the actual. Some are possible, and some are 
impossible.3 According to MM, A(?xA(x)) holds in full generality; but it 
may not hold at the actual world (though it may). All that can be guar-
anteed is that it holds in some world or other, namely those worlds that 
realize the situation envisaged by the person who uses the description. Call 
this version of Characterization CPM. Th e name “Modal Meinongianism” 
is due to the fact that characterization is understood with reference to 
worlds other than the actual. Kroon’s objections explicitly target MM.4
1. Actually, even in this case there is a restriction on A(x), namely that it not contain men-
tion of encoding, or paradox results.
2. We shall refer to the last of these, Towards Non-Being, as TNB in what follows. Th e Berto 
references argue that Modal Meinongiansm is preferable to the other approaches.
3. Possible worlds are now common currency among analytic philosophers. For an introduc-
tion to impossible worlds, see Berto 2009.
4. Berto 2012 formulates the four versions of characterization slightly diff erently, without 
mentioning descriptions at all. CP: For any condition A(x), something satisfi es A(x). CPN: For 
any nuclear condition A(x), something satisfi es A(x). CPE: For any condition (which does not 
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Another feature of MM is that it limits, of necessity, what Meinong 
called the Principle of Independence of Sosein (the having of properties by 
objects) from Sein (their existential status). Some properties are indepen-
dent from existence, but some others (typically, those involving the having 
of causal features, or spatiotemporal location) are not: they entail it—at 
the actual world and, arguably, at all possible worlds. Kroon’s objections 
to MM target such a limitation, as well as the CPM.
Kroon has two objections. Th e fi rst is to the eff ect that “MM is […] 
much more unfriendly to central Meinongian intuitions than its pro-
ponents allow” (24). Th is hinges on the fact that, in the MM theory, 
actually nonexistent objects cannot actually have existence-entailing 
properties. Th ey can be characterized as having such properties, e.g., 
being a mountain and made of gold, but they can satisfy the character-
ization only at worlds diff erent from the actual. Th us “in particular, it is 
false, not true, that the golden mountain is golden”, and “such an out-
come is bound to strike many contemporary Meinongians as a reason to
reject CPM” (27). 
Th e second objection is to the eff ect that MM “cannot even guarantee 
that the golden mountain doesn’t exist” (23), it “cannot even endorse 
the Meinongian truism that an object like the golden mountain lacks 
existence” (24). Given the way nonexistent objects are dealt with in MM, 
“nothing in Priest’s theory allows him to conclude that the golden moun-
tain lacks all [the existence-entailing properties], yet it must lack all of 
them for it not to exist” (28). Kroon rightly takes this second objection 
as the more serious.
2. Preliminaries
We will explain in detail the fi rst objection, and take care of it, in Sections 
3 and 4. We will do the same with the second objection in Sections 5 and 
6. Before we set about these tasks, though, we need to clarify some issues 
concerning MM, and indeed Meinongianism in general. Kroon does not 
pay a lot of attention, we think, to some important distinctions; highlight-
ing them is a useful preliminary for addressing his criticisms.
mention encoding), something encodes A(x). CPM: For any condition A(x), something satisfi es 
A(x) at some world.  One can then add diff erent accounts of descriptions to this machinery, 
possibly with some extra conditions. Kroon, however, formulates the variants of the CP as in 
the text, and we follow him in this.
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Th e fi rst thing to notice is that, as a metaphysical theory, MM is not 
generally supposed to rule out the existence of things a priori. Did Homer 
ever exist? Th e city of Atlantis? Th at of Troy? It is preposterous to think 
that armchair metaphysics can address these issues all on its own: they are 
open to empirical investigation. We should not, then, expect MM itself to 
rule out that the golden mountain lacks existence. What Kroon therefore 
means in his second objection is that MM, plus what we know, largely 
a posteriori, about the world, cannot rule out the existence of things like 
the golden mountain.
But secondly, what kind of thing is the golden mountain—or, what does 
the description “the golden mountain” refer to? Kroon claims that MM 
“preserves Meinongianism’s traditional commitment to nonexistent objects 
but off ers a new account of their nature as objects and of the properties 
they might be said to have” (23). However, there is nothing like a single 
“nature” for nonexistents, whether one is a modal Meinongian or one of a 
more traditional kind. Meinongians are not committed, just because they 
claim that some things do not exist, to the nonexistence of some specifi c 
kinds of entity rather than others. One kind on which more or less all of 
them agree comprises purely fi ctional objects like Sherlock Holmes, Super-
man, Anna Karenina and Mr. Pickwick. But some treat mythical objects 
like Zeus or Th or as on a par with fi ctional objects, while others disagree. 
Some include mere possibilia—things that exist at other possible worlds but 
not at the actual one, like Wittgenstein’s merely possible oldest daughter. 
Some Meinongians take abstract objects as nonexistent too, while others 
follow Meinong’s original view and allow abstract objects to exist, though 
in a way diff erent from concrete existents (often called “subsistence”).5 One 
of us (FB), following Routley (1980), takes seriously the view that also 
past objects like George Washington or Socrates are currently nonexistent 
objects. Besides, one of us (FB again) considers fi ctional objects, unlike 
possibilia and past existents, as necessarily nonexistent, while the other 
(GP) disagrees: for FB, there is no possible world where Sherlock Holmes 
exists, while for GP, there is. It is a mistake, then, to treat Meinongianism, 
even only of the modal kind, as if it was committed to a unique view on 
what does not exist. Meinongianism, and also Modal Meinongianism, can 
come in very diff erent kinds.6
5. At least, this is so when the relevant abstract objects are consistent or well-defi ned: divi-
sion by seven and the set of natural numbers exist/subsist, but division by zero and the Russell 
set do not. Th anks to Kroon for pointing this out.
6. Quineanism as well—as we may call the opposite view that everything exists—comes 
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Th e third issue we need to focus on is linguistic (semantic and prag-
matic), and concerns the diff erent ways in which referential expressions, 
in particular descriptions, acquire—when they do—a denotation. Mei-
nongianism as such—as the claim that some things do not exist—does 
not commit one to any particular semantics and pragmatics of referential 
expressions, and specifi cally of descriptions. Th e admission of nonexistent 
objects per se does not even bring theoretical commitment to the claim 
that all singular terms denote (in all contexts of use). Th is is true of MM as 
of other forms of Meinongianism. Among Meinongians who subscribe to 
the nuclear version of the CP, Routley (1980) has all descriptions denote, 
whereas Parsons allows for non-referring ones, and claims that the issue is 
“primarily a linguistic question, or one of formulation” and does not entail 
“a serious ontological disagreement” (Parsons 1979, 653). Also, within 
MM, diff erent accounts are possible—and actual: TNB goes for the view 
that all well-formed singular terms should denote, but Priest (2011a) and 
Berto (2012) explore versions with non-denoting terms.
With these provisos under our belt, we can start addressing Kroon’s 
objections directly.
3. Against literalism
Kroon’s fi rst objection is to the eff ect that MM is contrary to “Meinongian 
intuitions” (24) or to the “spirit” of Meinongianism (27), or even plainly 
“strikingly counterintuitive” (24). Unlike naïve or nuclear Meinongianism, 
MM claims that characterized objects often don’t really and literally have 
their characterizing properties at the actual world. In particular, nonexis-
tent objects actually lack the existence-entailing properties they are charac-
terized as having: “it is at the very least misleading for MM to claim that 
CPM off ers a viable sense in which the golden mountain is golden when 
it admits that no golden mountain is actually golden” (32).
Now, we demur from the thought that Meinongians perforce intuit 
that the golden mountain is literally golden and a mountain. Th e home 
of Meinongianism is the theory of intentionality. We can think of, and 
have other intentional relations to, objects, and some of these do not exist. 
in extremely diverse forms. Some Quineans reject abstract objects, others admit them; some 
are presentists, other eternalists; some may count two or more objects in the same portion of 
spacetime, others always count at most one; some claim that being is spoken of in diff erent ways, 
others that it is univocal, etc.
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Th us we can think of the golden mountain. Th e object we think of had 
better be golden and a mountain in some sense—or what on earth are 
we thinking about? However, this does not have to be a literal sense (this 
does not, therefore, impact on the ability of the theory to “deal with the 
usual issues of interest to Meinongians”, contra Kroon, 28). Indeed, it 
had better not be. Such a claim is not only false, it is opposed to common 
and much more robust intuitions. Let us see why, by focusing on what 
all Meinongians take as the most uncontroversial kind of non-existents: 
purely fi ctional objects like Sherlock Holmes.
Th e alleged “intuition”, shared by naïve and nuclear Meinongianism but 
not by MM, consists, in fact, in the former views’ being aff ected by what 
Kit Fine (1982) called literalism: the idea that non-existents like Holmes 
literally and really have the (nuclear) properties they are characterized 
as having (in the relevant fi ctions). Clearly, nuclear features, like those 
of being a detective and of living in 221b Baker Street, are ascribed to 
Holmes in the Doyle stories. Naïve and nuclear Meinongians want these 
properties to be had by Holmes at the actual world. MM denies this, as 
Kroon rightly stresses (26f.): for modal Meinongians like us, Holmes is a 
detective and lives in 221b Baker St., only at the worlds that realize the 
characterization provided by Doyle, not in actuality.
Now, we ask literalists: how could Holmes literally possess those fea-
tures? In reality, Baker Street 221b hosted an enterprise, the Abbey Road 
Building Society, and it has never been the house of any private detective. 
It is literally false, not true, that 221b is, or has ever been, Holmes’ home. 
In one of the Doyle stories we are told that Holmes has tea with William 
Gladstone (the example is due to Woods 1974). How can this be literally 
true? William Gladstone is a real (past) existent, who certainly never had 
tea with any purely fi ctional object. 
One may claim that Holmes actually lived in a nonexistent 221b Baker 
Street, or had tea with a nonexistent doppelganger of Gladstone. But this 
multiplication of objects is itself counterintuitive. Fictional stories include 
lots of references to nonfi ctional objects, which are only represented in the 
stories as interacting with purely fi ctional ones. Napoleon features in War 
and Peace, and Napoleon was a very existent man. MM is not forced to 
treat “Napoleon” as ambiguous, as it happens in forms of realist abstrac-
tionism about fi ctional objects à la van Inwagen (1977, 51): (a) normally 
denoting the historical character, i.e., the concrete and (formerly) real 
man; but also (b) referring to a quite diff erent abstract object, when the 
name occurs in extra-fi ctional discourse on the literary character of War 
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and Peace; and, perhaps, also (c) denoting nothing at all, when it occurs 
in the intra-fi ctional discourse of War and Peace. Such ambiguities seem 
to be introduced ad hoc, because they are not confi rmed by the intuitive 
data: competent speakers have no sense of the postulated ambiguity. As 
the Wikipedia entry on War and Peace claims: “Th ere are approximately 
160 real persons named or referred to in War and Peace”.7
Besides implying claims that are in point of fact false, literalism sev-
ers intuitive nexuses between properties, and specifi cally between various 
properties and existence—which, to Meinongians, is but yet another non-
blanket feature of individuals. As a nonexistent, Holmes cannot literally 
have features that entail existence, like living in a real street, having tea 
with Gladstone, or being a detective. If something is a detective and lives 
in a London street, then it is natural to think that it is a human being, a 
physical object, a spatiotemporal occupier, and endowed with causal prop-
erties. Asking where the person is, or why, as a detective, they cannot help 
the metropolitan police to solve crimes, is quite sensible: things lacking 
real existence cannot really have existence-entailing properties involving 
causal features or spatiotemporal location.8
Th e “Meinongian intuitions” discharged by MM are precisely literalist 
intuitions. We claim that they have to be disrespected, because they are just 
wrong. Nor is MM the only form of non-literalist Meinongianism on the 
market. Dual copula Meinongianism also denies that Holmes literally is 
a detective living in Baker Street. As a nonexistent object, for dual copula 
7. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_and_Peace. As Kroon pointed out to us, some 
combinations of descriptive expressions and names, like “the Napoleon of War and Peace”, may 
still provide some support to the ambiguity view: cf. “Th e Napoleon of War and Peace is a cleverly 
constructed character, very diff erent from the real Napoleon”. Berto (2011) proposes that even 
these fail to force a multiplication of referred objects: both “the Napoleon of War and Peace” 
and “the real Napoleon” refer to the one Napoleon. Th e price to be paid is that one needs to 
paraphrase something away: the former expression should be read as something like “Napoleon, 
as represented in War and Peace”, and the latter, as “Napoleon, as  he really is/was”.  
8. Here’s how the point is nicely made by Nathan Salmon: “Undoubtedly, existence is a 
prerequisite for a very wide range of ordinary properties—being blue in colour, having such-
and-such mass, writing Waverley. But the sweeping doctrine that existence universally precedes 
suchness has very clear counterexamples in which an object from one circumstance has properties 
in another circumstance in virtue of the properties it has in the original circumstance. Socrates 
does not exist in my present circumstance, yet he has numerous properties here—for example, 
being mentioned and discussed by me. Walter Scott, who no longer exists, currently has the 
property of having written Waverley. He did exist when he had the property of writing Waverley, 
of course, but as every author knows, the property of writing something is very diff erent from 
the property of having written it. Among their diff erences is the fact that the former requires 
existence” (Salmon 1998, 290f.).
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Meinongians Holmes only encodes these properties, encoding being dis-
tinct from exemplifi cation. Holmes can exemplify and literally have lots of 
properties, such as being nonexistent, being self-identical, being thought 
of by us, etc. But the features ascribed to him in the Doyle stories are 
for the most part only encoded, not literally exemplifi ed, by Holmes. So 
MM’s non-literalism does not even make it an isolated faction among the 
Meinongian tribes.
And not only are those literalist “Meinongian intuitions” wrong: they 
are not even common-sense intuitions. We agree with the arguments of 
Sainsbury (2010, 26ff .), to the eff ect that people don’t even share the belief 
that Holmes really is or was a detective, and really lives or lived in 221b 
Baker Street. People do not believe such claims as “Holmes lived in 221b 
Baker Street” to be correct descriptions of actuality. It is generally agreed 
that, if someone believed something like this, she would stand in need of 
being corrected by those who know better. 
Th ink of a London policeman replying to a tourist asking where 221b 
Baker Street, the famous residence of Sherlock Holmes, is located: “Sir, 
Sherlock Holmes does not exist and has never existed; it’s just a fi ctional 
character due to the novelist Conan Doyle. Baker Street, well, that does 
exist: it’s just down there. But Holmes didn’t really live there: he only lived 
there according to Doyle’s stories”. 
Th e policeman gets it right, in the non-literalist way, by just relying on 
common sense. Intra-fi ctional ascriptions of existence-entailing proper-
ties like being a detective or living in Baker Street are to be understood 
as implicitly prefi xed by an “according to the story”, non-factive clause. 
Th is is often omitted in conversation but contextually easily understood 
(as noted in TNB, 117, fn. 2). We move seamlessly from truth in reality 
to truth according to a fi ction and back all the time. An historian lectur-
ing on the ancient Greeks’ religion claims: “Zeus is the king of the Greek 
pantheon, living on Mount Olympus, …” etc. We understand him as 
speaking the truth, for we know he means: that was so according to the 
Greek mythology, not in reality.
4. What we do all the time with “a/the F”
Literalism is thus both false and unintuitive, and MM is right in rejecting 
it. A linguistic point is left open, though, and clearly spotted by Kroon 
in Section 3 of his paper. MM’s non-literalism entails that, unlike what 
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happens with literalist (naïve and nuclear) Meinongianism, many defi nite 
and indefi nite descriptions will have to refer to things that don’t currently 
or actually satisfy the relevant conditions. Kroon’s example, mentioned 
above, involves “the golden mountain” referring to something that is nei-
ther a mountain nor golden at the actual world. But we can equally well 
keep using Holmes as our chief example. According to MM, nonexistent 
Holmes is not really a detective, nor does he really live in Baker Street. 
However, we use such features to build descriptions apparently success-
fully referring to him. We felicitously refer to Holmes as “Doyle’s detective 
living in 221b Baker Street”. How come?
We reply that even this is not a theoretical minus of MM, because we 
do felicitously use descriptions to refer to things not actually or currently 
satisfying them all the time; nor is this an issue having specifi cally to do 
with Meinongianism, or nonexistence. Let us see why.
Donnellan’s (1966) famous referential/attributive distinction might well 
be taken to show that we can use descriptions to refer to objects that don’t 
actually or currently satisfy them. “Th e man over there with the champagne 
in his glass is happy” successfully refers to a man in the corner who is, as a 
matter of fact, happily drinking sparkling water. Kripke’s (1977) rejoinder 
to Donnellan is also well-known. We should distinguish between speaker 
referent, the object a speaker intends to refer to, and semantic referent, what 
is literally referred to. Only the latter has to do with semantics properly, 
whereas investigation of the former falls in the realm of pragmatics. Our 
intention to refer to a person who, unbeknownst to us, has water in his 
glass, does not aff ect the proposition literally expressed by our utterance of 
“Th e man over there with the champagne in his glass is happy”: this does 
not depend on the speaker’s intentions but on the description’s semantic 
denotation, which cannot be any non-champagne drinker.
But even if one accepts the distinction between speaker referent and 
semantic referent, it remains the case, as all may agree, that the semantic 
referent of a description is context dependent. Th us, in “Th e President 
wants to see you”, “the President” will normally refer to diff erent people if 
this is said in the White House or the Bundestag. And the person picked 
out in a context may not be the person who actually satisfi es the condi-
tion. Th is can happen because of spatial displacement. Th us, suppose that 
we are in the USA, where the current president is Barack Obama. Yet we 
talk about Germany, and you say “Th e President may be the head of state, 
but actually, the person who runs the country is the Chancellor, Angela 
Merkel”: “the President” would then refer to Joachim Gauk. Or, it can 
192
happen because of temporal displacement. Th us, suppose that we are in 
the UK, and the monarch is Elizabeth II. However, we are discussing the 
life of Shakespeare, and you say that the Bard never met the Monarch: 
“the Monarch” would refer to Elizabeth I.
As so often happens, there is a modal analogue of this temporal phe-
nomenon. Th e Earth is the third planet from the sun. However, suppose 
we are discussing an envisaged situation where the Solar System is pretty 
much as it actually is, but there is a sub-Mercurial planet, Vulcan. In this 
context, “the third planet from the sun” refers to Venus. Which brings, 
us, of course, very close to fi ctional objects. Th e smartest cocaine-using 
detective in London is probably some corrupt member of the Metropolitan 
Police Force. But if we are talking about the world as described by Conan 
Doyle, “the smartest cocaine-using detective in London” certainly refers 
to Holmes. Defi nite descriptions, then, can semantically refer to things 
that do not actually have the features in question. And this can be the case 
whether or not the object in question exists—as the previous examples 
make clear.
Semantic reference is, as we have noted, context-dependent. And what 
context we are in depends on many factors, one amongst which concerns 
the intentions of the speaker (does one mean to be talking about an histori-
cal epoch? Or about a hypothetical scenario? Etc.). So even for semantic 
reference, it is worth noting, intentions do get in the act. Incidentally, this 
is explicitly acknowledged in TNB (where choice functions are integral to 
the denotation of a description, as we shall see in detail in due course):
Th e deployment of a choice function is a recognition of the fact that, as far 
as the formal semantics go, the denotation of the descriptive term is non-
deterministic. Th at is, the denotation of the term is something that is deter-
mined by factors outside the semantics. Principal among these is context, and 
especially speaker intention. […] Th us, suppose you say (truly), for example: ‘I 
saw a man on the tram I was on yesterday; he looked rather sad.’ Th e referent 
of ‘a man on the tram I was on’ in this context is the particular man whom 
you saw, and to whom you now intend to refer. (Note that there could have 
been more than one sad-looking man on the tram; but you are talking about 
a particular one of them.) Of course, you could be lying: the man on the tram 
was not sad. Th e description refers to him none the less. Maybe you didn’t 
even get on a tram at all. In that case, the description refers to the presumably 
non-existent object intended in your imagination. (TNB, 94)
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5. De re reference fi xing
We now turn to Kroon’s second objection.  He claims that MM, together 
with what we know about the world, “cannot even guarantee that the 
golden mountain doesn’t exist”.  After stressing that characterized objects 
in MM may often lack the properties they are characterized as having at 
the actual world, he claims that what would be even “far less acceptable” 
(27) is the golden mountain’s having existence-entailing properties at the 
actual world:
Whatever is it like at the other worlds, at the actual world the golden moun-
tain is not granitic or silver, nor is it located on Uranus, or in any other part 
of the universe, for it does not exist at the actual world, and to have any 
existence-entailing property at a world a thing has to exist at that world. And 
the reason we know it does not exist at the actual world is that nothing at the 
actual world is uniquely a golden mountain. (28)
However, Kroon continues, MM cannot accept this conclusion. Even once 
we know that nothing is a golden mountain at the actual world, MM 
cannot sustain the right reply to the question: “How do we know that 
nonexistence is among its [the golden mountain’s] properties?” (28). We 
cannot say that the object characterized as a/the A “possesses no existence-
entailing properties, even when we know that there are no As” (29). Th e 
theory licenses only the claim that the golden mountain exists at the worlds 
(or at least, at the possible ones) where it has the properties it is character-
ized as having, namely where it is a mountain and made of gold; but the 
theory is silent on the actual existential status of the object.
Which object? As we argued in the previous section, the referent of a 
description is usually context (and intention) relative. Th en there is mostly 
no unique answer to the question. While Kroon apparently acknowledges 
this (as we will see), he develops most of his objection plainly talking 
of the golden mountain as if what was referred to by the description 
was, context-independently, a unique thing. Th is is not so, though. MM 
cannot give a single reply to Kroon’s question, “How do we know that 
nonexistence is among the golden mountain’s properties?” “Th e golden 
mountain” can refer to things of quite diff erent kinds in diff erent contexts, 
and quite diff erent replies to the question will have to be given in such 
diff erent contexts. Sometimes we will know that the object referred to by 
the description does not exist on the basis of our empirical information 
about the actual world. Sometimes we will know that it does not exist on 
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the basis of our knowing the kind of thing at issue (and, of our having 
the right ontological account of things of that kind). Sometimes we will 
even know that the thing at issue is existent—and also, if such be the case, 
that it is grey and granitic. Context and speaker intentions will make all 
the diff erence.
Here’s one context where the description refers to an existent object. We 
often make up stories by intentionally referring to real, existent objects, 
which we nevertheless characterize via properties they actually lack: we 
use them as props in games of make-believe. Kroon acknowledges that 
“sometimes our imaginative activities are directed at existent things” (29). 
Children can pretend that the elm in the garden is a magic tree, or that 
their bike is a Harley 883. Similarly, we can start to tell the following story:
Imagine that when Edmund Hillary fi rst climbed mount Everest he dis-
covered that, because of some peculiar geological phenomenon, its summit 
was largely made of almost pure gold. Soon expeditions were organized 
from different countries to reach the top of the mountain: everybody 
wanted to take advantage of the golden mountain and many international
controversies began …
In the context created by our story, “the golden mountain” obviously refers 
to mount Everest. We single out an existent by telling a story de re about 
it. Th en we refer to it as the golden mountain, and it is understood that 
the thing is only represented as being such within the story, without it 
actually being so. 
In such a context, it is not true that “whatever it is like at the other 
worlds, at the actual world the golden mountain is not granitic or silver” 
(Kroon, 28) because it doesn’t exist. We know what “the golden moun-
tain” denotes in such a context, and we know that Everest is actually 
existing, grey and granitic.9 Th is very existent object has the property of 
being golden at the worlds that realize our story, those of being grey and 
granitic at the actual world, and that of being a mountain both at those 
worlds and in actuality.
9. We may take the Everest as grey and granitic for the sake of the argument. Having such 
properties is arguably a matter of degree for mountains. As it happens, anyway, mount Everest 
does include substantive amounts of grey stones and granite (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Mount_Everest).
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6. Where Kroon is right
In the sort of context last envisaged, one takes an existent object, refers 
to that de re, and then imagines a non-veridical situation about it. Th ere 
is a quite diff erent sort of context, however. And about this, Kroon has 
a very valid point to make. One can hypothesize or imagine a certain 
scenario, and then one can refer to an object in that scenario. Th us, one 
might postulate the existence of a sub-Mercurial planet, or imagine and 
start to write down a story about an eccentric detective. In this sort of 
situation, the reference of the description is not parasitic on some prior 
act of reference-fi xing. In such cases, the CPM itself determines how the 
reference of the description is fi xed.
TNB, 92-3, formulates the CPM as follows (simplifying slightly to avoid 
irrelevant complications, and where @ is the actual world):10
(i)  If something satisfi es A(x) at @, ?xA(x) denotes one such thing.
(ii)  If not, it picks out some object or other which satisfi es A(x) in the 
situation one is envisaging.
Formally, the picking out in each case is done by a suitable choice func-
tion; informally, this represents an intentional act (the intentional act can 
be construed in both a realist and a non-realist way: see Priest 2011a). 
Now there is nothing in this account which requires ?xA(x) not to exist. 
Nor should there be, at least as far as clause (i) is concerned. Let A(x) be 
“x is a sub-Mercurial planet responsible for the precession of Mercury’s 
perihelion”. Th en, as a matter of fact, nothing existent satisfi es A(x). But 
had the world been diff erent, the description could have referred to an 
existent object: had A(x) been satisfi ed at @, the description would have 
denoted a planet, therefore a causally effi  cient object, therefore (for MM) 
an existent.
However, there is an issue with clause (ii). Nothing in this case requires 
?xA(x) to refer to a non-existent object either (as TNB, 92, does point 
10. Kroon, fn. 7, takes TNB to task for calling descriptions rigid, suggesting that what it 
should say is that the expression “the object represented as being the golden mountain” is rigid. 
But TNB means exactly what it says. Once the denotation of ?xA(x) is picked out, the description 
refers to that object in every world (which is not, of course, to say that the object satisfi es A(x) 
in every world). Besides, a non-rigid semantics for descriptions is also possible, as explained in 
TNB, 93.  Kroon also says, fn. 9, that for MM, if there is an actuality operator in the language, 
this must work diff erently at possible and impossible worlds. He cites Beall as showing that “this 
is a serious weakness”. It is not, as is shown in Priest 2011b, 3.3.
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out). But this seems wrong. In such cases the term should refer to a non-
existent object. Th us, Vulcan does not exist; neither does Sherlock Holmes; 
neither does Zeus (where these names are to be taken as abbreviations for 
an appropriate description). Here Kroon is exactly right.
Th e change to the theory to rectify the matter is, however, very simple. 
Clause (ii) can be reformulated as:
(iii)  If not, it picks out some non-existent object or other which satisfi es 
A(x) in the situation one is envisaging. 
(Here the non-existence is actual: the object may well exist in the relevant 
non-actual situations, of course). With this change, if nothing satisfi es the 
characterizing condition at @, the object referred to does not exist. So 
none of Vulcan, Sherlock Holmes, and Zeus, exists.
We can, in fact, pack clauses (i) and (iii) into one, showing how there 
is a uniform act of intentionality. Let ? abbreviate “At @, some y is such 
that A(y)”. If ? is a choice function on sets of objects, then the denota-
tion of ?xA(x) is:
(iv)  ?({x : (? and A(x)) or (??, x is a non-existent object, and the 
envisaged world is one where A(x)}).
One worry one might have here is that this is an ad hoc modifi cation of 
the theory. But it is not: it simply rectifi es an oversight in the original for-
mulation of TNB. When we construct a theory of intentionality with its 
denizens of objects, existent and non-existent, we are trying to account for 
the obvious data: that one can think of things whether or not they exist, 
that we can tell a story about mount Everest in which it is golden, and 
that Vulcan does not exist. All theorising, including our modifi cation, is 
ad hoc in this unobjectionable sense. Th e new version of the theory simply 
takes into account a bit of data that had been overlooked. Such ad hocness, 
thus, is quite unlike the one mentioned in Section 3, where an ambiguity 
which is not supported by the data is needed to defend a literalist view.
One should note that, in the last instance, any theory of descriptions is 
constrained in such an ad hoc way. To illustrate: all can agree that if some-
thing satisfi es A(x), ‘?xA(x)’ refers to such a thing.  Th e problem is what 
to do in the other case. If one is not a noneist, then, in such a situation, 
we have a case of reference failure. How then to proceed? One possibil-
ity (Frege’s) is to assign the description an arbitrary denotation—say the 
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empty set. Let us take ‘Sherlock Holmes’ to be short for an appropriate 
description. Th en this policy will make ‘Sherlock Holmes exists’ true. And 
what is wrong with that? Simply that it gets the data wrong.
Another policy is to make every atomic sentence false by defi nition (say 
the contextual defi nition of Russell). Alternatively, however, we might 
make every such sentence true by defi nition. And what is wrong with that? 
Again, it gets the data wrong. Th is policy makes ‘Sherlock Holmes lives in 
Beijing’ true. Any policy concerning descriptions must be constructed to 
do justice to the data in such a way. Th at is what the theory is for.
Coming back to the present proposal, another worry one might have 
concerns how one manages to intend a non-existent object.  Kroon himself 
raises this worry:
[T]he response depends on an author’s having the ability to intend a non-
existent object, knowing a priori that the object she thereby selects is indeed 
nonexistent. It is diffi  cult, however, to make sense of such an ability. How 
can the agent know a priori that the object she manages to select is in fact 
nonexistent? […] Couldn’t the agent intend what she takes to be a nonexistent 
object, but just make a mistake? We can make mistakes when intending an 
existent object; we might be hallucinating “that mountain in the distance”, 
for example. So why not when intending a nonexistent object? (32)
Now, fi rst, on the above account, one cannot know a priori that the 
object intended does not exist, since one cannot know a priori that noth-
ing at @ satisfi es A(x) (at least for possible conditions). As we made clear 
at the beginning of this paper, this cannot in general be settled by the 
MM theory as such: it depends on how things turn out in the world. In 
particular, one might intend the description to refer to an existent object 
(as did the scientists who postulated Vulcan), but the intention may not
be realised.11
If, however, nothing actually satisfi es A(x), the denotation of the descrip-
tion, the object intended, is a non-existent object. One may hear Kroon as 
asking: How so? Indeed, how does one intend an object with any proper-
ties, particularly the one defi ning the set on which the choice function in 
(iv) operates? One answer is that it is the very nature of intentionality to 
single out an object of a certain kind, and given a bunch of objects, one 
can just point mentally to one, in the same way that, given a bunch of 
11. Th e distinction between intending to (aiming to) refer to a non-existent object, and the 
object actually intended (as the target of the act of reference) being non-existent, may clear up 
some misunderstanding in the personal communication referred to by Kroon (31).
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physical objects, one can point physically to one of them12 (indeed, an act 
of physical pointing presupposes the intentional act that goes along with 
it: otherwise, one could be pointing at many things).  And if one imag-
ines an object with certain properties then, ex hypothesi, what one does is 
imagine such a thing. Th is is not a defense of psychological infallibilism. 
We may, indeed, think that our mental state is something that it is not. 
Rather, it is the phenomenological analogue of Kripke’s (1971) point that 
a possible world where Humphrey won the election is, ex hypothesi, a world 
where Humphrey won the election—and, we might add: won the election. 
At any rate, this is a quite general issue with MM, and the revised deno-
tation conditions for descriptions do nothing to make the matter better
or worse.13
Let us fi nally, in this section, see how the revised defi nition addresses 
Kroon’s Hillary counter-example (32-3). Th is is as follows. At 8,848m 
above sea level, Everest is the tallest mountain in the world, and Hilary 
climbed it once. Suppose that Fred believes all this—except that he thinks 
that Everest is 10,000m above sea level. He then imagines the highest sub-
9,000m mountain in the world which was climbed by Hillary twice—call 
it “H2”. He is confi dent enough that this does not exist, but is not cer-
tain, so does not intend (aim) to refer to a non-existent object.  Now, H2 
presumably has ordinary modal properties, including the property that 
there is a world w in which H2 is the highest sub-9,000m mountain and 
was climbed by Hillary just once. Th e question for Kroon is how MM 
can rule out the actual world being such a w: if it is, then H2 is Everest 
and H2 does exist after all.
Th e answer is that it is the non-existence of H2 that rules this out.   
Th ere indeed are worlds w of the kind described, but the actual world 
is not one of them.  For let A(x) be the condition “x is the highest sub-
9000m mountain in the world and Hillary climbed x twice”. According to 
the account just given, since nothing satisfi es this condition at the actual 
world, ?xA(x), that is, H2, does not exist.  So while Fred did not intend 
to refer to a non-existent object, the object intended, hit by the act, was 
non-existent nonetheless.
12. Th is answer is defended in Priest 2011b, 1.5. Some people fi nd it more plausible that 
this can happen in the case of non-existents if the intentional act creates the object, in a certain 
sense: see Priest 2011c, and Berto 2012, Chapter 9. Of course, “create” here cannot mean “bring 
into existence”. Rather, it means to extend the domain of discourse with a new object. 




In the Preface to Towards Non-Being, Priest claimed:
Nor do I take the version of the [MM] view presented here to be defi nitive. 
A number of the techniques developed in the book are relatively novel and 
untried, and I would be surprised, indeed, if better techniques could not 
sometimes be found. (Priest 2005, x)
Indeed so. Most of the points raised by Kroon in his paper can be addressed 
by MM—and some of them quite easily, as we have seen. But Kroon’s fi nal 
point forces us to declare the initial MM account, as presented in TNB, 
in need of revision. We will still be surprised if no further revisions turn 
out to be required in the light of future inspection. By triggering the one 
just described, Kroon’s paper is, we think, the most perceptive criticism 
of MM to date.14
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